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Abstract 
Pattern formation is crucial for maintaining biodiversity and cooperation in nature and human 
society. We review recent works on the formation of spatial patterns in the framework of 
evolutionary games, involving rock-paper-scissors game and social dilemmas. The 
rock-paper-scissors game, as a basic paradigm for characterizing nonhierarchical cyclical 
competition in ecosystems, has been widely used for studying biodiversity sustained by species 
coexistence. Spiral waves and target waves have been observed in spatially dispersed population 
with mobility, which has been deemed play significant roles in species coexistence. For social 
dilemmas, the formation of cooperator clusters is a key factor for the survival of cooperators who 
can resist the invasion of defectors in the pattern of clusters. Several underlying mechanisms 
contributing to the formation of various spatial patterns will be reviewed in spatial games. 
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1. Introduction  
   Biodiversity and cooperation are fundamental to ecologic and social systems. Understanding 
mechanisms that facilitate factors for biodiversity and cooperation is an important issue which is 
frequently addressed in the framework of the evolutionary game theory. Individuals compete with 
others to maximize its offspring in ecologic systems, while to obtain largest payoffs in social 
systems. Spatial patterns in spatially dispersed populations have been found to play significant 
role in the maintenances of species coexistence and cooperation.  
    Species coexistence and relevant coevolutionary dynamics, as a key factor to maintain 
biodiversity, have motivated growing interests [1-7], ranging from theoretical biology to nonlinear 
physics. Recent experiments have demonstrated the importance of non-hierarchical, cyclic 
competitions to coexistence, such as in carcinogenic microbes [1], certain lizard populations [8], 
mutant strains of yeast [9] and coral reef invertebrates [10]. The coevolutionary dynamics driven 
by such competitions can be well captured by the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game, particularly 
associated with spatial dispersal to stabilize coexistence [6]. Quite recently, population mobility, as 
a basic feature of ecosystems, has been incorporated into spatial cyclic competitions to better 
mimic individual activity [11]. A critical mobility has been identified, below which species can 
coexist in the pattern of entangled travelling spiral waves; when mobility exceeds the critical value, 
biodiversity is lost. Inspired by this model, some effort has been devoted to such coevolutionary 
dynamics, such as investigating noise and correlation [12, 13], instability of spatial pattern [14, 
15], and conservation law for total density [16]. It is demonstrated spatial pattern formation 
greatly affect biodiversity. 
For social dilemmas, as one of the representative games, prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) 
seizes the characteristics of the conflict between the selfish individuals and the collective interests. 
In PDG, when most of the individuals take the cooperation strategy, the collective interests is 
optimized, but as to an individual, if it defects when its opponents cooperate, it will profit much 
greater, and meanwhile its opponents will profit little or none. Thus, due to the selection pressure 
routed in the fundamental Darwinian assumption, more and more individuals will choose to defect, 
and as a result the level of cooperation will decrease. There are many mechanisms that can 
promote the cooperation of PDG such as repeated interaction [17], spatial extensions [18], 
reciprocity [19], and partly randomly contacts [20]. The heterogeneity of payoffs had also been 
found playing a crucial role in promoting cooperation in PDG [21]. The common characteristic is 
that the cooperation strategy spreads through cooperator clusters, which form spatial patterns.  
2. Spiral and target waves in RPS games  
  According to the previous works [11-15], PRS games involve three species, marking A, B, and 
C, and nodes of an L × L square lattice present mobile individuals belonging to one of these three 
species. Each node can either host one individual of a given species or it can be vacant. Vacant 
sites are also the so-called resource sites. Within the model three processes are possible, namely 
predation, reproduction and exchange, whereby these occur only between neighboring nodes. 
Predation: species A eliminates species B at a rate 1, whereby the node previously hosting species 
B becomes vacant. In the same manner, species B can eliminate species C, and species C can 
eliminate species A, thus forming a closed loop of dominance between them. Reproduction:
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individuals can place an offspring at a neighboring vacant node at a rate 1. Exchange: two 
individuals, including vacant sites, can exchange their position at a rate D , thus introducing the 
mobility of the participants. Therefore, the mobility can be defined: 
2/(2 )M LD .
Fig. 1 Pattern formation for different mobilityˈL = 500. Biodiversity is promoted for mobility below the value 
cM , and spirals emerge. With increasing M (from left to right), the spiral structures grow, and outgrow the system 
size at the critical mobility cM . Then Biodiversity disappears, in which uniform populations remain and which 
one species surviving is randomly determined. 
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2 Spirals (up) and anti-spirals (bottom) for different mobility, (a)M= 51.0 10u , (b) M= 55.0 10u , and 
(c) M= 41.0 10u ˈL = 500. 
We performed extensive computer simulations of the stochastic system with different initial 
conditions. For random initial condition in which three species as well empty sites randomly 
distribute on the lattice, when the mobility of the individuals is low, diversity with all species 
coexisting and self-organized patterns of spirals are observed, as shown in Fig. 1. With increasing 
mobility M, the structures spirals grow in size, and disappear for M> cM , and the 
44.5 10cM
| u [11]. In the absence of spirals, the system adopts a uniform state where only one 
51.0 10u 55.0 10u 41.0 10u 45.0 10u
cM
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species survives, while the others have died out, and which species remains is determined in a 
random process. 
In case the so-called heterogeneous initial conditions are used the initial setup of the three 
species and empty sites are the following: three roundish areas with radius of 10.5 are occupied by 
the three species respectively. It is interesting to note that the different direction of initial location 
of species leads different revolving direction of spirals: clockwise location of species A, B, and C
inducing clockwise revolving direction of spirals, contrariwise, anticlockwise location inducing 
anticlockwise direction, as shown in Fig. 2.  
Beside the different initial conditions, we also introduce a localized periodic current of the 
three competing species. In particular, the periodic current is applied over a small (compared to 
the overall system size) area located at the center of the spatial grid. The periodic current thus acts 
as a pacemaker on the population, trying to impose its rhythm on the spatiotemporal evolution of 
the three species. The current is defined as follows: at time t = 0 the nodes inside R=10.5, are 
populated by species A, at time 0t T these nodes are populated by species B, at time 02t T 
these nodes are populated by species C, at time 03t T  these nodes are again populated by 
species A, and continuing further in this manner. Importantly, during 0 0nT t mT  , where m= n 
+ 1, the evolution of species inside R is governed by the same Monte Carlo updating as outside. 
Moreover, from the definition of the current it follows that its period equals inT = 3 0T . In the 
following, we will consider the mobility M and the time
0T  between successive replacements of a 
species inside R as the two crucial parameters effecting the emergence of target waves in the 
examined model.  
It is of interest to investigate the impact of other values of these two parameters on pattern 
formation as well. Fig. 3(a) shows the typical snapshots of the spatial grid obtained for different 
mobility M of individuals after a long simulation time. Evidently, low mobility fails to evoke 
target patterns. In the leftmost panel of Fig. 3(a), where 
510M  , turbulent spirals dominate 
over the entire lattice. For 
410M  , on the other hand, the locally introduced inhomogeneities 
due to the periodic current are appropriately enhanced to eventually result in the emergence of 
target waves, as depicted in the middle panel of Fig. 3 (a). Increasing the mobility further to 
310M   evokes a transition from target to spiral waves, as depicted in the rightmost panel of 
Fig. 3 (a), which is due to the strong mixing of individuals prohibiting the stability of the relatively 
stationary target wave pattern and instead favoring the more dynamically evolving spiral waves. 
From the phase diagram presented in Fig. 3(b), it follows that the region of coherent target waves 
is relatively small, and that the phenomenon thus results from a rather subtle interplay between the 
localized periodic current and the overall dynamics of the three species. 
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     Fig. 3 Characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid for M = 0.00001 (left), M =0.0001 (middle) and M =
0.001 (right), obtained after long transients have been discarded. In all the three panels, yellow, red and 
blue squares denote species A, B and C, respectively, whereas the gray squares depict vacant sites. 
Employed parameter values are: 
0T = 150 and L = 500 (Figures comes from Ref. [15]).  
3. Cooperator cluster in PD games  
   In classical PDG, an agent updates its strategy according to the following rule: the agent i plays 
PDG with its neighbors, then randomly selects a neighbor j, and adopts its strategy with 
probability 
1
1 exp[( ) / ]
i j
i j
G
P P To
 
 
, where T characterizes the stochastic noise. For T=0,
the individual always adopt the best strategy determinately, while irrational changes are allowed 
for T>0. In numerical simulation, noise level is often set as T=0.1 because a few irrational 
behavior is common in real economic systems. With the probability defined above, if the selected 
neighbor j obtains more payoff than node i, node i will adopt the neighbor’s strategy with larger 
probability, but if the neighbor j obtains less payoff than node i, the probability will be much 
smaller. It is worth noting that the parameter b has great effects on the cooperation process and 
with b’s increasing, more and more agents would be defectors. We present a scheme that regulates 
the total payoffs continuously and try to find the optimal regulation strength. In our regulation 
scheme, we define the regulated payoffs i iW P
D , where D is the regulation parameter which 
determines the regulation strength and when D =1, our model degenerates into the classical PDG. 
Therefor, we replaced the payoffs iP  and jP  by the regulated payoffs iW  and jW , and we 
get generalized probability 
1
1 exp[( ) / ]
i j
i j
G
W W To
 
 
.
    Figure 4 (a) shows the cooperation fraction C
U
 as a function of b at different values of D .
It displays that C
U
 decreases monotonically with the increasing of b, no matter what D  is. Most 
interestingly, the cooperation is greatly affected by the parameter D  for fixed b: in a large region 
of D , CU   will be increased, indicating the reduction in heterogeneity of payoffs will improve 
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the cooperation. It is worth noting that there is at least one optimal value of D , where CU  takes 
its maximum, larger, or smaller D  will cause the decreasing of CU . Thus, to quantify the effects 
of D  on the promotion of cooperation for different b, we present the dependence of CU  on D
in Fig. 4 (b). It is clearly seen that with D ’s decreasing from 1, CU  will increase prominently 
and at the point 0.5D | CU  reaches its maximum, and after that the value CU  will decrease 
until no cooperators in the system. It has been confirmed that intermediate D  promotes 
cooperation, while too small or too large value of D  has the reverse effects. In Fig. 5, three 
typical snapshots are displayed to show how the system will be when D  takes small, 
intermediate, and larger values. Clearly, most of the cooperators are not distributed in isolation but 
form some clusters. When the payoffs are not regulated (D =1.0) or regulated too much (D =0.3), 
there are only a few cooperator clusters in the system; but when 0.5D | , there will emerge so 
many cooperator clusters that the cooperation is remarkably promoted. 
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Fig. 4 Fraction of cooperation CU  as a function of b in (a) and D  in (b). b is fixed at 1.01 in (a) (Figures comes 
from Ref. [21]).  
     Fig. 5 For panels (a), (b), and (c), typical snapshots of the distribution of cooperators (light gray) and 
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defectors (black) on a square 100 100u  lattice obtained for a different value of D  by b =1.01. (a) D =0.3, (b) 
D =0.5, and (c) D  =1.0 (Figures comes from Ref. [21]).  
4. Conclusion
   In conclusion, self-organized spatial-temporal patterns have been widely observed in spatially 
dispersed populations. A variety of spatial patterns play key roles in the maintenance of 
biodiversity and resolving the social dilemmas of profit versus cooperation. Pattern formation can 
have potential implications in diverse spatially extended systems, such as reaction-diffusion 
systems. Understanding the underlying mechanisms relevant to the formation of various spatially 
pattern is challenging yet, met by scientific communities from different contents. 
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